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Regulatory Cooperation in International 
Trade and Its Transformative Effects on 
Executive Power* 
ELIZABETH TRUJILLO** 
ABSTRACT 
As international trade receives the brunt of local discontent with 
globalization trends and recent changes by the Trump administration 
have put into question the viability of such trade arrangements moving 
forward, there has been a clear trend in using international trade fora 
for managing regulatory barriers on economic development. This paper 
will discuss this recent trend in international trade toward increased 
regulatory cooperation through the creation of formalized transnational 
regulatory bodies, such as the U.S.-EU Regulatory Cooperation Body 
that was being discussed in the TTIP negotiations and comparable ones 
in the Canadian-EU Trade Agreement as well as U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-
Canada Regulatory Councils. In examining the informal transnational 
                                                                                                     
*  This article derived in part from the 2016 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUDIES SYMPOSIUM on “The Transnational Executive,” which was held at the Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington. Thus, this article can also be considered 
as part of the collection published in Volume 24 of the Indiana Journal Global Legal 
Studies that focused on the transnational.  
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of Transatlantic Economic Governance in the Age of the BRICS,” held at the Max Planck 
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Executive,” at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington; the Center for 
Political Science and Constitutional Law Studies (Centro de Estudios Politicos y 
Constitucionales) in May 2017 in Madrid, Spain; and the Trade Law in the Trump Era: A 
Transatlantic Perspective CONFERENCE held at Boston University School of Law in 
September 2017. The author thanks the participants, especially Professor Fred Aman and 
Professor Andrés Boix Palop of Administrative Law at the University of Valencia, at these 
venues for their comments and suggestions on prior drafts. Special thanks to Anna Roy 
from Suffolk University Law School for her excellent research assistance on this project. 
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regulatory networks that have emerged from trade integration, it 
becomes clear that fragmentation has created non-centralized avenues 
for dialogue among various stakeholders to influence domestic 
regulation, especially in areas of environmental regulation, energy, and 
sustainable development. The paper argues that this trend has led 
toward the institutionalization of regulatory cooperation through 
preferential trade agreements, rather than multilaterally. Transnational 
regulatory networks and more formalized means of regulatory 
cooperation have influenced the executive branch, traditionally charged 
with negotiating trade agreements, from lead negotiator to a “regulatory 
partner” working not only for reducing barriers to trade, but also more 
specifically for the streamlining of regulatory standards that impact 
costs of inputs along the supply chain. Given today’s negative climate 
around globalization and recent U.S. initiatives to diminish the role of 
agencies all together to implement regulation, this trend could take yet 
another turn—one that centralizes decisions regarding regulation in the 
President and his cabinet. 
INTRODUCTION 
As Brexit negotiations are under way in Brussels and NAFTA 
renegotiations continue on the other side of the Atlantic, one can only 
ponder at so much popular discontent over trade, twenty-three years 
after the “golden decade” for globalization. The 1990s was an important 
decade for globalization advocates: the European Union (EU) solidified 
its political and legal shape in November 1993 and the World Trade 
Organization came into existence with its robust dispute settlement 
body in January 1995. In 1994, the Free Trade Agreement for South 
American countries known as the MERCOSUR was finalized, and the 
North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was executed. What has 
been referred to as “the constitutional moment” for globalization was 
born;1 international and regional institutions would be the guiding light 
for economic globalization through the rule of law and international 
courts. Despite the benefits that Europe, Britain, and the United States 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE (1998); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990); 
Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005); 
Robert Howse, Moving the WTO Forward–One Case at a Time, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 223 
(2009); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and the Millennium Round, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 111133 (Marco Bronckers & 
Reinhard Quick eds., 2000). But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s 
‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 647 (2006) 
(challenging the view that the WTO is a constitutional entity). 
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have enjoyed from international trade, being the major architects of the 
trading system and international institutions that we have today, these 
regions have exhibited a shift away from globalization toward 
isolationism, from liberalizing trade and integrating economies, toward 
protectionism. However, this trend has not diminished the role of 
transnationalism, particularly as it pertains to regulatory coordination 
among countries, especially at the regional level. This is primarily 
evident when taking a close look at recent negotiations for preferential 
trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP),2 the Canadian-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), and the the Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Partnership Agreement (TTIP). These agreements 
primarily address non-tariff barriers, as opposed to tariff barriers, and 
create mechanisms for institutionalizing regulatory coordination 
through the creation of transnational regulatory coordination 
committees and/or boards. In this way, they bring regulators and trade 
policy makers together and in turn, expand the influence of the U.S. 
executive branch in the development of regulations that are also trade-
friendly. 
This paper will examine the ways in which international trade 
agreements have influenced the role of the “transnational executive,”3 
bringing together agency expertise, through the negotiating power of 
the executive, with commerce and trade. In the United States, this 
trend, in combination with trade promotion or “fast-track” authority, 
which has limited the congressional ability to dispute already 
negotiated trade provisions once the agreement is ready for 
congressional vote, has expanded executive power to participate in 
regulatory processes in new ways, especially for the environment and 
energy. The paper will discuss the current trend in international trade 
toward increased regulatory cooperation through the creation of 
formalized transnational regulatory bodies, such as the U.S.-EU 
Regulatory Cooperation Body discussed in TTIP negotiations. It will 
examine the more informal transnational regulatory networks emerging 
from trade integration, as ways in which non-centralized avenues for 
dialogue among various stakeholders may influence domestic 
regulation, especially in areas of environmental regulation, energy, and 
                                                                                                     
 2. President Trump signed an executive order withdrawing the United States from 
the signed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Withdrawal of the United States from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017). 
However, the remaining parties continue ahead with a possible signing of the TPP, 
without the United States, in March 2018. See Shawn Donnan, et al., Trans-Pacific Trade 
Deal to Go Ahead Without US, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/7a10d70a-0031-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. 
 3. For discussions on the evolving legal system of transnationalism, see the collection 
of articles found in Issue 2 of Volume 24 of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies.  
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sustainable development. In doing so, these regulatory networks change 
the role of the executive branch, traditionally charged with negotiating 
trade agreements, from lead negotiator to a “regulatory partner” 
working not only for reducing barriers to trade, but also more 
specifically for the streamlining of regulatory standards that impact 
costs of inputs along the supply chain.  
The paper will proceed as follows. The first part will discuss recent 
changes in the approach of the executive branch when it comes to 
regulation, focusing on the traditional principles in administrative law 
that facilitate the use of trade agreements as platforms for domestic 
regulatory reform by the executive branch. Furthermore, it will 
demonstrate a trend in transnational cooperation among agencies 
across borders. It will also discuss some of the nuanced relationships 
among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches as the role of 
presidential authority shifts, especially when coupled with its power to 
negotiate international trade agreements which address domestic 
regulation.  
The second section will discuss the ways regulation has changed 
from command and control mechanisms toward more market-driven 
voluntary forms of regulations. In this trend, regulatory networks have 
emerged, setting standards for countries and across borders. These 
transnational regulatory networks, consisting of state and non-state 
actors including the private sector have also influenced international 
standard-setting organizations as well as international trade. This 
bottom-up strategy for regulation has implications for governance;4 and 
in particular, for the kinds of technical expertise reaching agencies. As 
regulators increasingly participate in the execution of trade agreements, 
they can also influence economic strategies.  
The third part will examine recent trade agreements and their focus 
on the reduction of non-tariff barriers, rather than tariffs, and the 
development of transnational regulatory councils to enhance regulatory 
harmonization and convergence across borders. It will compare these 
trends in the NAFTA, CETA, TTIP, and TPP, and specifically consider 
the ramifications for environmental sustainable development and 
natural resources. Even though the TPP and TTIP agreements have 
been put on hold for now,5 these plurilateral agreements marked an 
important trend in negotiating trade agreements, with a domestic 
emphasis on using preferential trade agreements to further economic 
                                                                                                     
 4. Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy 
and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environmental Matters, 25 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001). 
 5. See references cited supra note 2. 
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and regulatory goals rather than the multilateral framework, and they 
will likely remain as models for future trade agreements. 
Finally, the paper will discuss some of the challenges ahead with 
using international trade agreements as platforms for changing 
domestic regulatory policy. It will examine some ways in which this 
trend in preferential trade agreements not only impacts domestic 
policies but also those of the developing world. It will discuss the 
geopolitical contexts in which the transnational executive authority is 
negotiating such trade agreements, wherein different economic powers 
are impacting their outcome. Finally, the paper will conclude with 
reflections on the transformative effects on executive power in the 
context of trade and regulatory cohesion. 
I.  REGULATORY COORDINATION AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
President Obama’s 2012 executive order, No. 13609, which was built 
on an earlier executive order calling for the improvement of regulation 
and regulatory review, directs executive branch agencies and 
encourages independent regulatory agencies to identify regulations with 
international impact and also to strive to eliminate unnecessary 
regulatory divergences.6 It also explicitly recognizes the relevance in 
international trade in impacting and shaping domestic regulation.  
The order defines “International regulatory cooperation” as a 
bilateral, regional, or multilateral process, other than processes that are 
covered by section 6(a)(ii), (iii), and (v) of this order, in which national 
governments engage in various forms of collaboration and 
communication with respect to regulations.7  
This push for transnational regulatory cooperation and recognition 
of the role of international trade in shaping domestic regulation 
formally bridges the State Department and other administrative 
agencies in various ways, concentrating the responsibility of developing 
policies for the social policy space in the executive branch and less in the 
legislative. In part, it was a response to the need for interagency 
coordination, where many areas of regulation and administration are 
fragmented and have overlapping administrative scope.8 One of the 
primary purposes of congressional delegation of authority to 
administrative agencies is to facilitate centers of expertise and 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012). 
 7. Id. at 26,414. 
 8. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133–34 (2012) (stating that “interagency coordination is one of the 
great challenges of modern governance”). 
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specialization in key areas concerning the public interest, like 
environmental protection. However, with the increased number of 
agencies and specialized areas of expertise, there can be redundancy 
and inefficiency in the creation and execution of regulations.9 Some 
scholars have suggested various ways in which there can be more 
streamlining of agency work, including various types of coordination 
tools such as interagency consultation, interagency agreements, and 
joint policymaking.10 Another tool may include more centralized 
mechanisms through the President’s ability to deploy different councils 
and task forces, bringing together various areas of expertise to consult 
on specific topics.11 Using international trade agreements as a platform 
for aggregating agency expertise on issues from food safety and 
licensing measures, to management of fisheries and cross-border trade 
provides yet another avenue not only for agency coordination, but also 
for the President to use his authority as key trade negotiator to 
centralize these coordination efforts further and set the agenda for both 
international trade and regulation. Interestingly, one of the first 
regulatory agencies was the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 
which, at the time, handled the regulatory aspects of the railroad 
industry in the late 1800s and was key to the economic development of 
the United States. In the years that followed, the U.S. Congress 
expanded its regulatory scope into areas of food and drugs, unfair 
competition, shipping, and radio. The next section will provide some 
background on the ways in which regulatory authority in the United 
States passed from the legislative branch to the executive one. 
A. Regulatory Authority in the United States  
1. Delegation and Chevron Doctrines 
Professor Jaffe noted that delegation of legislative power to agencies 
is “the dynamo of modern social services state.”12 Debates in the United 
States around the delegation doctrine turn on the balance between 
whether such power should remain within congress or delegated to 
agencies and between decentralization by transferring such power to 
                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 1135 (discussing areas where such redundancy and inefficiencies may 
manifest). 
 10. See id. at 1136. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on the Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 561, 592 (1947). 
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bureaucratic yet specialized work of agency expertise.13 Furthermore, 
the extent of federal agency power over state regulatory authority is not 
always clear under the Administrative Procedure Act,14 despite the role 
of U.S. courts to strike the right balance.15 Traditionally, the hope has 
been that the technical expertise of agencies would be better situated to 
implement congressional legislation, especially at the time of the New 
Deal when there was an increase of specialized agencies and rise in 
social programs. However, the extent to which agencies should have 
such authority has been the topic of much scholarly debate, especially 
concerning issues of accountability and the rights of individuals.16  
Despite legislative powers in the United States being vested in 
Congress, throughout U.S. jurisprudential history, there has been an 
understanding that the resources of Congress may be best used by 
delegating some of its powers to more specialized agencies that can 
implement congressional statutes at lower decision costs.17 
Furthermore, under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution, Congress may establish, through statute, the 
establishment of a program along with implementation guidelines but 
delegate the actual implementation to the experts and technicians 
                                                                                                     
 13. U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 1 provides the initial authority for Congress to 
legislate: “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1. This Article has been the basis for the non-delegation doctrine in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 reiterated the general principle that Congress cannot 
delegate its legislative power. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
 14. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012). 
 15. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 
2028 (2008) (examining “how the Court may be employing administrative law as a vehicle 
for addressing federalism concerns” and “assess[ing] how well administrative law 
performs this role and how the Court should understand the relationship between 
federalism and administrative law”). This article identifies the federalism-reinforcing 
features of Administrative law, but concludes that the Court’s decisions have not gone far 
enough in this respect. 
 16. See generally, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 132–33 (1980) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court, in reviewing administrative decisions, should devote itself to 
assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights); JAMES O. FREEDMAN, 
CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 15–20 (1978) (examining the causes of the enduring sense of crisis 
associated with the administrative process and arguing a theory of legitimacy for the 
administrative process must be created); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 63 (1965) (proffering that courts and administrative agencies 
“are in a partnership of lawmaking and law-applying” that operates in a matrix of 
congressionally delegated authority). 
 17. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) 
(recognizing, for the first time, that Congress could delegate policymaking authority under 
“an intelligible principle” within the statute that would guide agency discretion); see 
generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9–36 (2001) 
(discussing the evolution of the delegation doctrine). 
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inside an agency.18 The Supreme Court has struggled with the 
pragmatism of the delegation doctrine with the need to protect the 
democratic principle of ensuring that decisions concerning social policy 
remain within the legislative branch rather than in the hands of 
technocrats that may not come under the same scrutiny ensured by the 
democratic process.19 
Overall, the traditional literature for Congress’s delegation power is 
that delegation takes away its own policy-making authority, 
transferring it to the executive branch, as the heads of agencies are 
Presidential appointments and members of his cabinet.20 This 
transference, however, is a zero-sum game because Congress will 
always fight for its legislative authority when necessary and structural 
competition among the branches will prevent from overreach of any one 
branch.21 
In addition to the delegation doctrine, Courts have used the Chevron 
doctrine to provide deference to agency decisions when there are gaps or 
ambiguities in the congressional statute regarding issues within the 
agency’s purview. The Court noted in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 
Inc., that “the court may not substitute its own construction for a 
reasonable interpretation”22 by an agency. A detailed analysis of judicial 
nuances of the Chevron doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Suffice it to say that it allows the Court to provide a reasonable review 
of the agency’s analysis of the text of a statute in conjunction with a 
                                                                                                     
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For judicial elaboration on the contours of the 
justifications of such delegation, see, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that the Live Poultry Code, approved by an executive order, 
was invalid because Congress had improperly delegated legislative power to the Executive 
Branch); J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 396 (finding that Congress could not 
delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, having laid down the general 
rules under which a commission should proceed, it could require the application of such 
rules to particular situations). 
 19. A “public interest” perspective on administrative agencies focuses on the role of 
agencies as being for the promotion of a social policy or “public value.” A “public choice” 
view would emphasize that administrative agencies are the result of competing interest 
groups and self-serving legislators. See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and 
Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government 
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148–49 (1977) (distinguishing between the two models). 
 20. See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the 
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1469–76 (2015) (discussing the conventional 
separation of power issues with the delegation doctrine). 
 21. See id. at 1468; see also Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 61, 147 (2006); see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation 
of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2359 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2097, 2148 (2004). 
 22. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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court’s inquiry into the legislative purposes behind the measure in 
question.23 It also stands for the general principle that if the agency’s 
review is reasonable, the Court will defer to the agency interpretation of 
the law in question, which may include not only a statutory provision 
but also the scope of agency expertise as well as relevant procedural 
formats.24 Justice Scalia embraced the idea that judicial deference to 
agency interpretations forced the legislative branch to “bear the ‘costs’ 
of delegations by assigning policy-making choices to the executive[,]”25 
which in turn caused Congress to “choose when and how it delegates 
authority.”26 Furthermore, such judicial deference allows courts to 
deflect judicial lawmaking to the executive branch, thereby allowing the 
political process to “correct” any “excessive [congressional] 
delegations.”27  
While much of the traditional literature on agency power focuses on 
specific areas of public policy with which each agency specializes, calls 
for efficiency and more transparency among different regulatory spheres 
have allowed for enhanced inter-agency coordination. This “shared 
regulatory space” would allow regulators from different specialized 
agencies to better coordinate policies with overlapping goals.28 
Fragmentation of agencies can result in regulatory bargaining over 
which agency is best situated to oversee certain regulations; this in turn 
can have perverse effects on the stringency of certain regulations such 
as environmental protection. Legislators, regulators, and the President 
may have varying views in this regulatory bargaining process. 
Lawmakers may address these areas of conflict in different ways, 
including creating new agencies or delegating policy discretion to more 
than one agency, creating fragmentation.29 At times, fragmentation may 
allow for more independence and specialization of agency work. On the 
                                                                                                     
 23. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 17, at 492. 
 24. See id.; see also Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based 
Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989 (1999). Relevant case law regarding judicial 
interpretations of reasonableness include: AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 
(1999); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. DOT, 843 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Int’l Union, 
UMW v. FMSHRC, 840 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1988); NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986). 
 25. Rao, supra note 20, at 1474. 
 26. Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013). 
 27. Rao, supra note 20, at 1475. 
 28. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1136. But see Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency 
Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015) (proposing that agency heads possess 
substantial discretion in reorganizing the internal structures and processes of an agency 
and that as a result of this authority and external political factors, the unit of analysis 
should be primarily on intra-agency coordination, rather than on inter-agency 
coordination). 
 29. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1141. 
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other hand though, resulting redundancies and inefficiencies can 
undermine the regulatory goals themselves.30 
Cross-border regulatory cooperation, through transnational 
networks, has allowed for increased dialogue among regulators across 
borders.31 This paper will further discuss the ways in which recent 
trends in international trade agreements to establish mechanisms for 
cross-border regulatory coherence have further expanded this “shared 
regulatory space,” allowing the executive branch to merge domestic 
regulatory goals with that of trade liberalization policy. In doing so, 
domestic agency coordination may be enhanced, but also regulatory 
bargaining becomes more centralized in the executive power through 
the President’s constitutional authority to negotiate trade agreements.32 
The expansion of congressional delegation authority, along with its 
close brother the Chevron doctrine, combined with the trade promotion 
authority (fast-track authority), which takes away some congressional 
power over approval of trade agreements, raises important questions 
about the transformative power of international trade on the power of 
the executive branch in the United States.33  
2. Trade Promotion Authority 
Foreign affairs, which include the negotiation of international 
treaties, does not belong exclusively to Congress. Broad delegations of 
congressional power to the executive branch are traditionally tolerated 
as decided in the Supreme Court case, United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., which involved Presidential authority with respect to 
international sale of arms involving U.S. companies.34 International 
trade is both within the scope of congressional authority, under the 
Commerce Clause of the Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, as 
well as within that of the executive branch under Article II. The 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 1141–45. 
 31. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing 
government officials’ networks to exchange information and coordinate activity across 
national borders to tackle crime, terrorism, and daily international interactions). 
 32. Article II §2 provides the President with authority to enter into treaties with two-
thirds of Senate approval. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 which 
provides Congress with the authority to regulate commerce. 
 33. Bipartisan Comprehensive Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320 (2015); Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (2015); see also Ian F. Fergusson, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, CONG. RES. SERV. 28 (June 15, 2015) 
(summarizing history of Trade Promotion Authority and legislative renewals of Trade 
Agreements Authority).  
 34. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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President has the power to make Treaties but only with the “consent 
and advice” of two-thirds of the Senate.35 
The congressional Trade Promotion Authority, or “fast-track 
authority,” first put into place in the 1970s, allows for increased inter-
branch harmony and efficiency.36 In short, from 1974 to 1993, Congress 
allowed that, in turn for being updated during the negotiation process of 
a trade treaty, there would only be an up or down vote (without 
amendments) and a simple majority in voting for the final negotiated 
agreement.37 It is an authority granted for a temporary period of time 
before it must be renewed by Congress, which occurred prior to the 
approval of the NAFTA in 1994. In 2002, President Bush signed the 
Trade Act which included a renewal of fast-track authority and which 
provided for some changes in procedures to allow for more input from 
Congress during the negotiating process.38 Under this Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority, several U.S. trade agreements were signed 
including Colombia, Panama, and South Korea.39 
The fast-track authority has been criticized by many as being 
undemocratic, a means of circumventing the democratic process of 
legislative debate on issues of international trade which are, in 
principle, within the power of the legislative branch under the 
Commerce Clause.40 However, these debates have been somewhat 
quieted with the understanding that for a temporary period of time, 
                                                                                                     
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 36. Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to 
Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 687, 695 (1996). 
 37. CHARAN DEVEREAUX, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL D. WATKINS, 1 CASE 
STUDIES IN U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATION, at 187–94 (2006). 
 38. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3803–3805 (2004). 
 39. See REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EXTENSION OF TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY: 
CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 2103(C)(2) OF THE TRADE ACT OF 2002 (2005). 
 40. See, e.g., Leslie Alan Glick, World Trade After September 11, 2001: The U.S. 
Response, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 63738 (2002) (discussing Congress’s debate over 
legislative authority and the constitutionality of TPA); Natalie R. Minter, Fast Track 
Procedures: Do They Infringe upon Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. 
LEGIS. & POL’Y 107 (1995). But see Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying 
Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 236 
(1995) (discussing the ways that fast track provides necessary flexibility to the Executive 
Branch in negotiating trade agreements) and Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and 
United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143, 14348 (1992) (arguing that fast 
track is not undemocractic). In the context of NAFTA and fast-track authority, see the 
debate regarding “congressional-executive agreements” in Bruce Ackerman & David 
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1995); and David M. Golove, Against Free-
Form Formalism, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998). 
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such authority is constitutional.41 Furthermore, the renewal within the 
2002 Trade Act allowed for increased participation and comment during 
the treaty negotiation process, tempering concerns of a steep democratic 
deficit at play. Though the 2002 Trade Act expired in 2007, it remained 
in effect for agreements already being negotiated until their execution.42 
In preparation for the conclusion of the TPP and TTIP agreements, 
Congress in 2015 approved the Trade Preferences Extension Act, signed 
into law by President Obama.43 
When fast-track authority is understood together with congressional 
delegation power and the Chevron doctrine, it raises interesting 
questions regarding (1) the role of administrative agencies in shaping 
executive authority when it comes to policies that will impact domestic 
regulatory practices vis-à-vis trade liberalization policies; and (2) the 
ways in which recent preferential trade agreements containing more 
formal structures for enhanced cross-border regulatory convergence, 
have the effect of concentrating regulatory priorities in the executive 
branch, away from the legislative branch. As a result, the expert 
knowledge of administrative agencies transforms to include trade 
liberalization goals and vice versa. This is especially true in the recent 
models for trade agreements where the focus of negotiations has been 
less on tariff reduction and more on non-tariff management, which in 
turn, requires increased regulatory convergence across borders. This 
will be further explored in the following sections which will focus on the 
relevance of two trends in this context: (1) the ways in which 
international trade impacts domestic regulation; and (2) the ways in 
which regulation has transitioned toward more market-driven 
mechanisms rather than traditional command and control forms of 
regulation.  
B. Regulatory Convergence through International Trade 
International trade rules encourage trade liberalization and 
discipline governments from passing protectionist measures. Article III 
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) provides that 
fiscal and non-fiscal measures must not discriminate against imports as 
compared to “like domestic products.”44 While tariffs have significantly 
                                                                                                     
 41. See Margaret M. Kim, Trade Promotion Authority: Evaluating the Necessity of 
Congressional Oversight and Accountability, 40 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 317, 325–26 (2016) 
(discussing constitutional basis of TPA). 
 42. Among the trade agreements approved during this time are: U.S.-Panama, U.S.-
Colombia, and U.S.-Peru. 
 43. Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (2015). 
 44. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5. 
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been reduced worldwide, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), those non-fiscal 
measures (such as regulatory measures) that may impact trade, still 
challenge international trade regimes. For this reason, much of the 
focus of the TPP and the TTIP negotiations were on finding ways to 
reduce non-tariff barriers, both through direct commitments in certain 
sectors like licensing requirements for intellectual property rights,45 but 
also by establishing specialized committees and transnational 
regulatory coordination bodies that would encourage and allow 
regulators of Parties to convene, review, and monitor the establishment 
and implementation of regulation.46 
Through the trade governance mechanisms found in the WTO and 
preferential trade agreements, the relationship between trade norms 
and regulatory ones has evolved, and in some instances, become more 
intertwined. This is particularly evident in the area of trade and 
environment, the relationship which will be the focus in this paper as it 
relates to regulatory convergence. There are key moments where the 
contestation of trade goals with those of environmental sustainability 
have allowed for the emergence of a dialogical focus on the contours of 
the relationship, allowing for possible shifts in the normative objectives 
of either domain while considering the multilateral, regional, and 
domestic aspects.47 
A dialogic approach has traditionally been associated with the role 
of courts and the ways in which they “communicate” with other 
branches of government. In international law, scholars such as Ruti 
Teitel and Anne-Marie Slaughter have examined the various ways that 
judicial comity manifests itself transnationally—fostering international 
reciprocity of international norms and enhancing the ability of these 
norms to travel across jurisdictional lines, even taking hold 
domestically. 48 In the trade context, different legal norms may interact 
transnationally. These interactions allow for cross-fertilization of trade 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, arts. 18.1-.83, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter 
TPP], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/t 
pp-full-text. 
 46. See generally infra Part IV, section A.  
 47. See generally Elizabeth Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach to Trade and Environment, 
16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 535 (2013) (using a dialogical approach to examine the vertical, 
horizontal, and diagonal dimensions of the trade and environmental relationship resulting 
in increased convergence between the norms of these two  
camps). 
 48. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 99, 117–19 (1994) (proposing that transnational judicial communication 
allows for norms to travel across legal systems and therefore, enhance cross fertilization 
for dissimilar areas of the law); see also Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a 
Global Age, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2570, 258487 (2004). 
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and non-trade issues.49 In focusing on the “dialogue” between trade and 
environmental norms through the vertical relationship between WTO 
dispute settlement bodies and regulatory processes of Member States, 
there is a dynamic process of the judiciary “engaging” with elements of 
domestic agency decisions.50 Trade dispute settlement bodies decide the 
viability of non-tariff trade barriers under trade jurisprudence for 
example.51 This process has in fact forced trade adjudicators into legal 
areas outside the trade scope, including environmental law and 
domestic regulation. An example of this is one of the first trade and 
environment cases, US Tuna I, in which the GATT dispute settlement 
body had to decide whether a U.S. moratorium on imports of Mexican 
yellowfin tuna under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act violated 
trade commitments.52  
Furthermore, the committee work of the WTO specialized bodies has 
an administrative character, especially as it supports the Secretariat on 
specific challenges for trade, such as the tense relationship between 
trade and environment.53 The horizontal relationship between the 
adjudicatory and administrative functions of the WTO creates another 
form of dialogue that may lead to cross-fertilization of trade and 
environmental norms. The discursive and dynamic aspects of 
adjudication can find their way into the administrative function of the 
WTO.54 The workings of the Secretariat and its working groups and 
committees allows the administrative parts of the WTO to become a 
political forum through which Member States may dialogue and reach 
                                                                                                     
 49. See generally Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47 (discussing ways that 
trade and environmental norms travel transnationally and converge). 
 50. See Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense of Alden, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161 
(2000) (discussing the dialogic aspects of the judiciary interacting with non-judiciary 
elements); see also ELIZABETH TRUJILLO, REFRAMING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 
LINKAGE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD (forthcoming 2018) 
(reframing the trade and environment relationship through a sustainable development 
lens and using a dialogical approach to identify three ways in which trade and 
environmental norms have converged during the various phases of the trade and 
environment relationship: vertically, horizontally, and diagonally). 
 51. See infra Part II. 
 52. Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R 
(Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter US-Tuna I] (concerning quantitative restrictions prohibitions 
under GATT Article IX; however, the DSB stated that if GATT Article III applied to this 
case, there could in fact be a violation of national treatment commitments). 
 53. See Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 539 (proposing that 
adjudication is only one aspect of cross-fertilization of trade and environmental issues and 
“[t]he discursive and dynamic aspects of adjudication can find their way into the 
administrative function of the WTO,” also contributing toward cross-fertilization of 
environmental and trade norms). 
 54. See id. 
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agreement (or not) on matters concerning trade and the environment.55 
Furthermore, committee decisions (and ministerial decisions) may in 
fact influence treaty interpretations of dispute settlement bodies, 
further impacting the ways in which trade and environmental issues 
may converge.56 Another way in which trade and environmental norms 
converge vertically, and horizontally in some instances, is in the 
interaction between the multilateral framework of the WTO and the 
regional frameworks of preferential trade agreements, such as the 
MERCOSUR. Brazil-Recycled Tyres,57 concerning Brazil’s moratorium 
on the importation of recycled tires for non-MERCOSUR members, 
provides an example of this dynamic.58 However, a detailed discussion 
on these vertical and horizontal dimensions is beyond the scope of the 
paper, as the primary focus will be on a third dimension for trade and 
environmental normative convergence.59 
A diagonal approach allows us to appreciate the impact that 
fragmentation has on the convergence of trade and environmental 
norms. From this perspective, there is no hierarchy per se in which to 
invoke various legal norms60—a trade dispute settlement body may 
consider legal norms in or outside of trade or in other international 
treaties and international environmental communities may be borrowed 
from trade norms.61 In this context, there may be parallel regimes 
having jurisdiction on similar issues—regional/multilateral, such as in 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Shaffer, supra note 4 (applying three alternative frames of the WTO’s handling 
of trade and environmental issues, the author discusses the “intergovernmental 
perspective” as one that allows states to bargain in the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment and respond to various stakeholder interests). 
 56. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R (adopted Sept. 
15, 2011) [hereinafter US-Tuna II] (using a TBT Committee decision, the WTO Appellate 
Body determined the meaning of “international standards” in the TBT Agreement). See 
generally, Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 560562. 
 57. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007). 
 58. For more discussion on this dynamic, see generally Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, 
supra note 47, at 562573. 
 59. For a discussion on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of normative 
convergence of trade and environmental issues, see generally TRUJILLO, supra note 50; 
Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47. 
 60. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
(2006) (stating that the main sources of international law are not in a hierarchical 
relationship inter se). 
 61. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of 
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2049–50 (explaining that one characteristic of a 
dialogical approach is that it has “bidirectionality”; and therefore, any court may initiate 
dialogue and engage with the jurisprudence of another). 
380 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 25:1 
the case of Chile-Swordfish, which was brought as both a WTO case and 
a UNCLOS case.62 Because of the lack of hierarchy, the fragmentation 
in trade adjudication becomes particularly relevant in understanding 
the ways in which environmental issues and trade cross-fertilize, 
especially with respect to vertical and horizontal forms of judicial 
engagement.63 
In addition and particularly relevant to this paper, this view also 
highlights the less formal means of convergence; namely, through the 
emergence of transnational regulatory norms which include voluntary, 
market-driven forms of regulation instead of the traditional command 
and control regulatory measures imposed and monitored by 
governments. These can include, for example, labeling schemes which 
are usually established by non-state actors like NGOs and sometimes 
monitored in conjuction with government.64 The following section will 
focus on this form of convergence, in which regulatory networks create 
informal collaborations that help to establish new regulatory norms 
from the bottom up, and which eventually find their way into the 
regulatory processes of governments. Trade agreements are becoming 
one way to adopt these forms of regulatory norms. 
II.  REGULATORY NETWORKS AS PART OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
A. “Informal Collaboration”: Transnational Regulatory Norms 
The development of transnational regulatory coordination bodies 
such as the U.S.-Mexico Regulatory Cooperation Council; the U.S.-
Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council; and the one being discussed in 
the TTIP, the U.S.-EU Regulatory Cooperation Body, seems like a 
natural progression in the life of transnational regulatory norms. Much 
                                                                                                     
 62. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Chile—Measures 
Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WTO Doc. WT/DS193/1 (Apr. 
19, 2000); Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish 
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Union), Case No. 7, Order of 
Dec. 16, 2003, ITLOS Rep. 65, 6971, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cas 
es/case_no_7/7_order_161203_en.pdf. 
 63. See Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 568577 (discussing the role 
of fragmentation in understanding the less formal means of convergence). See generally 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICHMOND L. 
REV. 99 (exploring the commonalities in the various horizontal and vertical forms of 
communication among courts transnationally). 
 64. See Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 579 (stating, “[i]n this new 
form of regulation, [non-state actors like] NGOs and private actors are working with 
intergovernmental organizations and governments to help create and monitor such 
standards”). 
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has been written regarding the ways in which globalization has allowed 
regulators from different countries to increasingly work together to 
develop understanding of regulation across boundaries and in turn, 
influence the creation of new regulations, from the “bottom up.”65  
Transnational regulatory norms are those that derive from public 
and private networks working together to create standards and 
regulations that may or may not be necessarily mandatory, but that do 
get adopted either through industry practice, industry consensus, and/or 
the forces of the free market. They are transnational because they move 
across borders and sometimes across international regimes.66 More 
understanding on these various movements of norms is needed; 
however, the actual movement from domestic across borders is 
transnational in nature and in scope.67 
On the regulatory front, increasing transnational structures and 
partnerships allow for the establishment of new standards and 
regulatory change. Many of the transnational regulatory norms arising 
from these partnerships are different from traditional forms of state 
regulation because (1) they do not necessarily derive from state 
government processes; (2) they are not always mandatory; and (3) they 
are not specifically enforced by the state but rather by private entities 
responding to market pressures. NGOs have demanded stricter 
regulation of international businesses and the protection of labor rights 
and the environment. This has led to increased awareness of the need 
for corporate social responsibility, for example, which is even reflected 
in various sections of the TPP such as the investment, labor, and 
environment chapters of the same agreement.68 While it is true that the 
corporate social responsibility provisions only require that parties 
encourage the enterprises operating in their respective territories to 
voluntarily implement voluntary standards of corporate social 
                                                                                                     
 65. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through 
Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 204 (Michael 
Byers ed., 2000); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: 
The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); Kal 
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks 
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
 66. See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 229, 246–47 (2012); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 192 (2003). 
 67. Shaffer, supra note 4, at 4 (distinguishing global law from transnational and 
explaining that there may be global law that moves through the international regime 
framework to influence or affect domestic law). 
 68. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 9.16; id. art. 19.7 (relating to labor); id. art. 20.10, 
(relating to the environment). 
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responsibility for their corporate practices, it is groundbreaking for 
trade agreements to incorporate such provisions at all.  
Transnational regulatory norms also evolve from private actors 
working with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs to help create 
such standards. Some examples of relevant intergovernmental 
standards would include the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Both 
were established through the WTO to help set harmonized standards for 
creating environmentally safe products and food standards in the case 
of Codex. In these ways, global norms trickle down toward the domestic 
and the transnational.69 Private firms have also collaborated with each 
of these global entities to create networks through which standards may 
be implemented and monitored by third parties. Many times these 
networks use standards by the intergovernmental organization. These 
networks allow for interaction of global regulatory norms and 
transnational ones, where the state may play a role but is not 
necessarily the source of regulation. In this way, global regulatory 
norms converge with transnational ones, impacting the ways in which 
regulations are implemented domestically. 
Transnational regulatory norms are particularly evident with 
respect to labeling schemes. An eco-label, for example, is one that 
identifies the product’s impact on the environment based on the life 
cycle of the product. It provides information to consumers about the 
relative environmental quality of a product. Several eco-labeling 
schemes, both public and private and even public/private regulatory 
schemes, turn to the international global standards of the ISO and 
Global Ecolabelling Network for guidance.70 The Global Ecolabelling 
Network, for example, is a non-profit organization consisting of private 
and public organizations that operate eco-labeling schemes and 
                                                                                                     
 69. Shaffer, supra note 66, at 232 (distinguishing between global laws, which are 
“universal legal norms [that] are being created and diffused globally in different legal 
domains[,]” and transnational law, which “comprises legal norms that apply across 
borders to parties located in more than one jurisdiction”). 
 70. Such eco-labels that use ISO and Global Ecolabelling Network include: Good 
Environmental Choice Australia; Biogarantie and Ecogarantie (Belgium); Qualidad 
Ambiental (Brazil); California Certified Organic Farmers; Canada Organic; Huan (China); 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EU); Green Label (Hong Kong); Eco-Mark (Japan); 
Ecoleaf (Japan); carboNZero (New Zealand); Vitality Leaf (Russia); Singapore Green 
Labelling Scheme (Singapore); E-Mark (South Korea); Green Mark (Taiwan); Green Seal 
(United States). Many countries, including the United States, have multiple eco-labels, 
some referring to ISO but others with unknown resources or other private resources for 
guidance, such as ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental 
Standards. 
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programs around the world, which comport with the ISO standards.71 It 
includes outside monitoring and is voluntary.72 Other schemes, 
especially in the United States, look to national standards, which are 
not necessarily connected to the ISO or any other international 
standardizing organization. In the EU, mandatory standards are not 
uncommon, though they usually are monitored and implemented by 
Member States even if the standards may be set by the EU Commission. 
This changing regulatory landscape changes the state’s traditional 
role in creating, monitoring, and enforcing regulation, for the private 
sector and civil society has taken on a larger role in setting regulatory 
standards and enforcing them.73 This dynamic, which has been termed 
the “Transnational New Governance model,” accommodates for the 
growing number of public-private partnerships establishing regulatory 
standards moving beyond borders.74 NGOs such as Rainforest Alliance; 
the Brazilian IMAFLORA; and the Brazilian coffee industry association, 
ABIC, are working together to certify Brazilian coffee as “sustainable” 
and using the Rainforest Alliance Certified seal.75 
                                                                                                     
 71. See generally GLOBAL ECOLABELLING NETWORK, https://globalecolabelling.net (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2018). See also ISO CENTRAL SECRETARIAT, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS AND 
DECLARATIONS: HOW ISO STANDARDS HELP (2012), https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites 
/isoorg/files/archive/pdf/en/environmental-labelling.pdf.  
 72. Other organizations, like ISEAL Alliance, are global associations for social and 
environmental standards, whose members consist of private entities, NGOs, and 
governments that establish and monitor the standards. ISEAL is also privately funded, 
with some support from governmental institutions like the World Bank and FAO. But see 
DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
REGIMES 148 (2007) (explaining that the GMO case between the EU and the United States 
demonstrates that NGOs are also limited in their influence vis-à-vis the state and political 
and consumer preferences). 
 73. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 505–06 (2009) (describing regulatory arrangements consisting of 
firms and industry groups as well as NGOs and members of civil society groups such as 
labor unions and socially responsible investors). 
 74. Id. at 542. For more discussions on New Governance, see also IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 
(Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992); THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW 
GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, 
Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 L. & POL’Y 
49 (1999). 
 75. For more on IMAFLORA’s mission, see IMAFLORA, Instituto de Manejo e 
Certificação Florestal e Agrícola http://www.imaflora.org/imaflora.php (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018). For more on Rainforest Alliance, see RAINFOREST ALLIANCE, https://www. 
rainforest-alliance.org (last updated 2018). For more on ABIC coffee association, see 
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DA INDÚSTRIA DE CAFÉ, http://abic.com.br/en/ (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018). For information on the joint efforts of IMAFLORA and Rainforest Alliance, see 
http://imaflora.blogspot.com/2017/10/rainforest-alliance-assume-completa.html. Note that 
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The ISO 14000 series environmental standards are readily used to 
help set up eco-labeling criteria for organizations that operate eco-
labeling schemes for private industries.76 The ISO has tried to 
standardize the principles, practices, and key characteristics relating to 
different voluntary environmental labeling types. It provides a forum for 
private business to coordinate standards through a market-based form 
of regulation based on consumer information.77 The consensus-based 
development of ISO standards also provides a forum for international 
dialogue on harmonization of domestic standards.78 
Governments that have their own eco-labeling scheme also may look 
to international standards, such as ISO, to set up their own criteria. For 
example, the German Blue Angel label was established in 1978 by the 
state and continues to be monitored by the state as well. While it is a 
voluntary label, it applies to consumer products and services and follows 
the international standards found under the ISO and Global 
Ecolabelling Network.79 The Blue Angel label has become so 
commonplace and prestigious that it has contributed to changing 
consumer behavior. The German Federal Environment Agency monitors 
these changes and incorporates them into established requirements and 
test methods for products.80 In this way, global regulatory norms have 
converged with transnational and domestic ones, allowing for some 
harmonization and predictability with respect to the use of the Blue 
Angel label. It has become one of the most trusted labels in Germany 
and is widely used by the private sector and by consumers to determine 
the environmental friendliness of the products they are purchasing. 
Criteria are developed for each product group, and the German Federal 
Environmental Agency requires that companies in Germany constantly 
                                                                                                     
failures of the Rainforest Alliance concerning labor rights have recently been discussed at 
Dom Phillips, Coffee from Rainforest Alliance Farms in Brazil Linked to Exploited 
Workers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustain 
able-business/2017/jan/04/coffee-rainforest-alliance-utz-brazil-pesticides-exploited-
workers-pay. 
 76. See, e.g., GLOBAL ECOLABELING NETWORK, https://globalecolabelling.net/ (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
 77. David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private 
Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009). 
 78. Id. at 85. 
 79. Blue Angel also is reviewed and adapted according to new scientific information 
and needs, and it follows ISO 14020, 140211, 14022, and 14025. See Our Label for the 
Environment, BLUE ANGEL, https://www.blauer-engel.de/en/our-label-environment (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2017). The Blue Angel label was actually the model for the international 
standard, ISO 14020 standard, which is the standard by which many new global 
environmental standards have been developed.  
 80. See id. for success stories of Blue Angel. 
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be improving the environmental friendliness of their products.81 It also 
specifies the particular resource that is protected to the greatest extent 
by the product. If the product protects the water to the greatest extent, 
then the label will have below it an indication to this effect. The four 
protection goals include: water, climate, natural resources, and 
environmental and health.82 
B. Trade and Transnational Regulatory Norms 
Transnational regulatory norms are making their way into 
international trade agreements, recognizing the relevance of labeling to 
trade liberalization. Since the inception of the TBT Agreement and SPS 
Agreements in 1994, several WTO cases have addressed labeling.83 
More specifically, cases involving labeling have focused on (1) whether 
the state has mandated the use of the label; (2) whether the label is in 
accordance to international standards or to an international 
standardizing body to which the respondent is a member; and (3) 
whether the application of the labeling standard discriminates between 
imports and like domestic products. WTO jurisprudence in this regard 
has focused primarily on whether the label amounts to a trade 
restriction by balancing the discriminatory impacts a label may have on 
imports against the legitimate purpose of the label itself. Environmental 
standards for labeling schemes that comport to international standards 
may be recognized as legitimate for purposes of trade compliance, since 
                                                                                                     
 81. See What Is Behind It?, BLUE ANGEL, https://www.blauer-engel.de/en/blue-
angel/what-is-behind-it (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). The Blue Angel label was actually the 
model for the international standard, ISO 14020 standard, which is the standard by which 
many new global environmental standards have been developed. 
 82. See The Logo, BLUE ANGEL, https://www.blauer-engel.de/en/blue-angel/what-is-
behind-it/the-logo (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). 
 83. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291, WT/DS292, WT/DS293 
(adopted Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC – Biotech Products]; First Written Submission, 
United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes: Recourse 
to Article 22.6 of DSU, WTO Doc. DS406 (adopted Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter US – Clove 
Cigarettes]; Request for Panel, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) 
Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/8 (adopted Oct. 9, 2009) (Canada); Request for Panel, 
United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS386/7 
(adopted Oct. 13, 2009) (Mexico); Pane Report, United States—Measures Concerning the 
Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R 
(adopted Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US – Tuna Panel Report]; Report of Appellate Body, 
United States—Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US – 
Tuna II AB]. 
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WTO panels tend to look to international standards for guidance when 
adjudicating domestic regulatory measures.84 
When governments use international standards, both the SPS and 
TBT agreements, for example, raise a presumption that such schemes 
are legitimate and not protectionist.85 When governments monitor such 
regulatory schemes based on other criteria than international 
standards, they run a higher risk that such schemes will be in violation 
of the trade commitments, especially if those measures are mandatory.86 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, for example, encourages governments 
to harmonize their sanitary and phytosanitary measures based on 
international standards, and creates a presumption of compliance if in 
fact those measures do conform with international standards.87 There is 
a presumption of compliance in the TBT Agreement if the technical 
regulation comports to international standards, which can be rebutted 
with proof that those international standards are ineffective for 
fulfilling the legitimate objective of the technical regulation.88 The TBT 
Agreement does not define “international standard.” However, in the 
2012 US-Tuna II case, the Appellate Body made significant steps 
forward in defining this according to a TBT Committee Decision that 
defined the parameters of a legitimate international standardizing body 
under the TBT Agreement.89 
US-Tuna II was the first time that the WTO ruled on the 
interpretation of Article 2.1 and dealt with these fine distinctions 
between state-centered “mandatory” regulations versus voluntary 
standards that tend to be anchored in the private sector. Both the Panel 
and the AB were willing to look to international standards and the ISO 
                                                                                                     
 84. US-Tuna II, supra note 56. 
 85. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 3, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.4, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. The same is true under NAFTA. North American Free Trade 
Agreement, arts. 701–724, 901–915, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289. 
 86. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 86 (ruling that an EU moratorium on the 
approval of biotech products as well as national marketing and import bans regarding 
genetically modified organisms were in violation of GATT); see also Joint Communication, 
European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WTO Doc. WT/DS26/28 (Sept. 30, 2009). 
 87. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, supra note 
85, art. 3(1)–(2), annex A(3). 
 88. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 85, art. 2.4, annex 1 
(explaining standards under the Agreement must be approved by a recognized body, and 
that the ISO/IEC Guide 2 is used for guidance in defining standards and technical 
regulations); see also US-Tuna I, supra note 52. 
 89. See US-Tuna II, supra note 56, at ¶¶ 353–54; see also Trujillo, A Dialogical 
Approach, supra note 47, at 56162. 
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definitions in interpreting provisions under the TBT Agreement. Recent 
free trade agreements encourage the establishment of voluntary 
mechanisms of environmental regulation by the private sector.90 After 
US-Tuna II, though, it is unclear how much state oversight will convert 
an otherwise “voluntary” regulation into a mandatory one for purposes 
of the TBT Agreement. The US-Tuna II decision, finding the U.S. 
labeling scheme mandatory, seems to imply that virtually any state 
action may in fact turn a labeling scheme into a mandatory technical 
regulation.91 Arguably, though, private voluntary standards would not 
raise questions of trade compliance since trade focuses on state action 
rather than private action, unless the state is involved in the 
enforcement of those voluntary standards.  
Trade regimes are also influencing the ways in which modern 
environmental regulation is developing, encouraging market-driven 
mechanisms that are voluntary at the regional level and harmonization 
of environmental standards at the multilateral level. This is nicely 
depicted in the TPP as well as drafts of the TTIP agreement. The CETA, 
recently ratified by the EU and Canada, contains separate chapters on 
Sustainable Development, the Environment, and Labor, containing 
specific provisions regarding the need for trade to be flexible so as to 
allow governments to implement climate change and clean energy 
mitigation policies.92 Some of these international standards are making 
their way into domestic legislation and domestic standards, and, as in 
the case of Blue Angel, have also influenced the character of 
international standards. For example, in 2016 the German government 
decided to make its National Sustainable Development Strategy “a key 
framework for achieving the SDG’s in Germany.”93 
Germany presented its first National Sustainable Development 
Strategy in 2002, which included national sustainability goals and 
indicators, and continued to consult with civil society groups and 
reported its progress. Germany has a Council for Sustainable 
Development, an independent advisory council which oversees the 
creation and implementation of sustainable development strategies. It 
released the third edition of the Sustainability Code, which is intended 
                                                                                                     
 90. See, e.g., US-Tuna II, supra note 56, at ¶¶ 353–54; United States-Colombia Trade 
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., art. 18.5, Nov. 22, 2006, 125 Stat. 462; United States-
Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, art. 18.5, Apr. 12, 2006, 121 Stat. 1455; 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.4, 
Aug. 2, 2005, 43 I.L.M. 514. 
 91. See US-Tuna II, supra note 56, at ¶¶ 193–94. 
 92. See infra Part IV.A.2(b). 
 93. See REPORT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL 
FORUM ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2016 (2016), https://sustainabledevelopment.un 
.org/content/documents/10686HLPF-Bericht_final_EN.pdf. 
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to provide companies with guidance regarding its strategic orientation 
toward incorporating sustainable development standards and provide 
customers and investors more transparency for making important 
business decisions concerning sustainable development. Though the 
Code was developed in Germany and created voluntary standards, it is 
tied to voluntary international reporting standards, making it suitable 
for companies doing business globally.94 Many of the tools in the Code 
are with respect to company disclosures on areas concerning natural 
resource management, greenhouse gas emissions, product management, 
and stakeholder engagement, as well as other sustainable development 
goals concerning disclosures on labor standards and ensuring human 
rights standards for different levels of business supply chains.95  
These are good examples of ways in which transnational regulatory 
networks have evolved into more formalized institutions for developing 
and implementing new standards fit for the twenty-first century. They 
are bottom-up in the sense that they have local and domestic 
governance structures, but they “dialogue” outside their jurisdictions 
with other standards-setting entities such as civil society, other state 
regulators, and within the international arena. International 
agreements, like the 2015 Paris Summit Agreement, also provide a 
more formal multilateral framework for countries to dialogue with each 
other on their progress regarding domestic decarbonization strategies 
and to report (every five years) on this progress.96 International trade, 
particularly through preferential trade agreements, is responding to 
these global concerns for climate change and the need to comply with 
sustainable development goals by incorporating provisions that attempt 
to address these concerns and recognize the need for international trade 
to become more flexible in allowing domestic sustainable development 
strategies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 94. See GERMAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE SUSTAINABILITY CODE: 
BENCHMARKING SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS 7–9 (4th rev. ed. 2017), https://www.deutscher-
nachhaltigkeitskodex.de/fileadmin/user_upload/dnk/dok/kodex/The_SustainabilityCode_20
17.pdf. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.unfccc.int/files/ho 
me/application/pdf/paris_agreement.pdf. 
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III.  PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
REGULATION 
A. Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Bodies as Models: NAFTA, 
TPP, CETA, and TTIP  
1. NAFTA  
History informs us that bilateral and regional negotiations of trade 
and investment agreements can serve as models for future multilateral 
commitments. In some cases, like NAFTA, concurrent negotiations can 
influence one another and even recognize the other agreement. NAFTA 
negotiations and the Uruguay Round negotiations were happening 
around the same time, both being enacted in January 1994. NAFTA 
affirmed the existing rights and obligations of parties to the GATT, 
incorporating specific provisions of the GATT, such as the GATT 
National Treatment provision for market access of goods,97 and the TBT 
Agreement for its chapter on Standard Related Measures, within the 
parameters of its own understandings of national treatment under 
Article 904.98 Interestingly, the NAFTA SPS measures chapter also 
recognizes, in part, the obligations and rights of the GATT on the 
parties, but specifically excludes national treatment obligations of 
Article 301 (which refers to the GATT) and provisions of Article XX (b) 
of the GATT. It is also stricter than the SPS Agreement in some aspects, 
allowing parties to have more restrictive SPS measures than 
international standards99 and incorporating its own definitions of 
discriminatory action.100 It specifically takes into account “technical and 
economic feasibility” in determining the necessity threshold for a party’s 
measure in furthering the regulatory goal.101 The NAFTA SPS chapter 
also recognizes a temporary precautionary principle allowed only for a 
limited period of time when the science is uncertain around a 
measure.102 These allowances in NAFTA reflected the concern at the 
time by environmental and health interest groups in the United States 
that environmental and safety standards would race to the bottom as a 
                                                                                                     
 97. See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 301, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 
32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 98. See id. art. 903–04. 
 99. See id. art. 713(2)(3). 
 100. See id. art. 712. 
 101. See id. art. 712(5). 
 102. See id. art. 712(4). 
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result of trade, especially because of different standards in Mexico.103 It 
was also the first U.S. regional agreement of its kind and served as a 
model for many of the subsequent U.S. free trade agreements, like the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).  
However one perceives the relative influence of regional 
negotiations for setting standards for future trade agreements and 
regulatory tolerance, NAFTA had a regulatory impact on Mexico. In 
some instances, it led Mexico to increase its labor and environmental 
standards; in others, it resulted in an influx of U.S. goods, including 
food products, into Mexico, which had mixed consequences for Mexico’s 
local production, especially in agriculture.104 Though no formal, 
overriding, regulatory cooperation body was formed at the time of 
NAFTA, transnational regulatory networks found a home in some of the 
side committees and agreements developed alongside or immediately 
after NAFTA. The focus was on capacity building, especially for Mexico, 
and U.S. regulators were instrumental in aiding Mexican regulators to 
improve and/or develop their own regulatory structures, many of which 
reflected U.S. standards.105 For environmental issues, some regulatory 
cooperation developed through the North American Agreement for 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the Commission of 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). Also, regulatory cooperation 
continued in specific areas through the La Paz and Boundary Waters 
Treaties (for U.S.-Mexico) and the renegotiation of the Canada U.S. 
Boundary Waters Treaty aimed primarily at managing the Great Lakes. 
As of 2010, the United States entered into separate negotiations 
with Canada and Mexico to establish High-Level Regulatory 
Cooperation Councils, comprised of senior-level regulatory, trade, and 
foreign affairs officials. These function more as transnational networks, 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Environment in Peril?, in IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION, 
135–61 (2007) (finding that concerns of environmental race to the bottom were not as 
dramatic as a result of free trade as originally anticipated). 
 104. By 1991, about two-thirds of the government-controlled industries were sold. 
Deregulation of the industries stimulated foreign investment. NAFTA solidified a trend in 
Mexico to replace import substitution programs with export promotion. Agricultural 
reforms in Mexico, begun in the 1980s to eliminate agricultural subsidies, expanded into 
the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1991, import controls and government direct price supports 
to the producer of nine of the eleven basic crops were abolished, and subsidies granted to 
agricultural inputs, credit, and insurance were drastically reduced. See MARK WEISBROT, 
STEPHEN LEFEBVRE, & JOSEPH SAMMUT, DID NAFTA HELP MEXICO? AN ASSESSMENT 
AFTER 20 YEARS 13 (2014) (discussing the trends in Mexico brought about by NAFTA).  
 105. See Raustiala, supra note 65, at 44–46. After NAFTA, Mexico created a new 
enforcement office, Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA) to enforce 
regulatory standards for management of border environmental issues. See id. at 47. 
PROFEPA’s scope is broader today, also managing natural resources, maritime resources, 
as well as forestry. See PROFEPA, http://www.profepa.gob.mx (last visited Dec. 12, 2017).  
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comprised of working groups from the regulatory agencies of each 
country, than formal regulatory bodies, as are being discussed in the 
TTIP. However, they promise to have impact in enhanced regulatory 
convergence between the United States and Canada and the United 
States and Mexico.106 The U.S.-Mexico High-Level Regulatory 
Cooperation Council Work Plan identified seven key areas of mutual 
interest: “food safety, E-certification for plants and plant products, 
trucking safety, nanomaterials, E-health, oil and gas, and conformity 
assessment.”107 The purpose was to make regulations more compatible; 
increase simplification and transparency; as well as enhance technical 
cooperation. The Work Plan also included “Food Safety Modernization,” 
which extends to the production, processing, and handling of food being 
exported and imported.108 It was also intended to engage stakeholders, 
including industry associations. The oil and gas working groups focus on 
Mexico’s hydrocarbons resources in the Gulf of Mexico, including ways 
of minimizing risk in exploration activities as well as emergency 
response plans, auditing and inspection, and training. 
Between the United States and Canada, the regulatory cooperation 
is focused on several areas of common interest, including natural 
resources and pipeline management; natural gas use in transportation 
of vehicles; food safety (with reciprocal recognition of each other’s food 
safety systems); and energy efficiency standards. There is an emphasis 
on information sharing of regulations but also of policy reviews so as to 
enhance regulatory cooperation. Stakeholder participation, including 
industry associations, is also recognized as important. Information that 
is considered business proprietary shall remain confidential and not 
publicly disseminated.109 The Council will also be made up of the central 
agencies of each country, including the trade and foreign affairs 
agencies. By establishing these regulatory cooperation councils as an 
extension of NAFTA and including participation of the trade and foreign 
affairs agencies of the respective parties, there is an explicit political 
                                                                                                     
 106. For the SPP Regulatory Cooperation Framework, the three countries will work 
together in a “Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.” See 
CANADA/UNITED STATES/MEXICO SPP REGULATORY COOPERATION FRAMEWORK, https://ob 
amawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/spp_regulatory_cooperation_fr
amework.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 107. UNITED STATES-MEXICO REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL: PROGRESS REPORT 
TO LEADERS 3 (2013), https://www.trade.gov/hlrcc/ (click “HLRCC – Progress Report – 
August 2013” to begin download). 
 108. See id. at 8. 
 109. See DEP’T OF NAT. RES. OF CANADA’S EXPLOSIVES SAFETY AND SEC. BRANCH ET AL., 
U.S.-CANADA REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL REGULATORY PARTNERSHIP STATEMENT 
2, https://www.trade.gov/rcc/documents/j-rps-nrcan-dot-phmsa-rps.pdf (last visited Dec. 
13, 2017). 
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and jurisdictional recognition that regulation and trade go hand in 
hand, further bringing the trade and regulatory discourses together into 
the same normative realm. This trend toward normative convergence 
continued into the TPP and the TTIP phase of trade governance.  
It is unclear whether the Trump Administration will continue the 
work of the North American Regulatory Cooperation Councils. As of the 
writing of this article, they were still in place, though NAFTA is under 
renegotiations.110 Recently, the Canadian American Business Council 
published a statement arguing in favor of ensuring the permanence of 
the Council.111 Regarding the U.S.-Mexico Regulatory Council, a 
workplan was put into place in February 2016.112 President Nieto and 
President Obama had already established in 2013 a U.S.-Mexico High 
Level Economic Dialogue to advance strategic economic priorities.113 
The Trump Administration seems to have an anti-regulatory position, 
given recent executive orders impacting several agencies.114 However, it 
seems to be more focused on diminishing funding and staff and on 
reducing the enforcement of regulations, rather than on repealing 
them.115 
                                                                                                     
 110. See, e.g., Sarah McGregor, Josh Wingrove & Eric Martin, Trump Swings into 
Action on Trade, Adds Edge to NAFTA Talks, BLOOMBERG POL. (Jan. 23, 2018, 1:35 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-23/trump-swings-into-action-on-trade-
adding-edge-to-nafta-talks; Josh Wingrove, NAFTA Trio to Gather in Davos as 
Negotiations Resume in Canada, BLOOMBERG POL. (Jan. 15, 2018, 11:25 AM) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-15/nafta-trio-to-gather-in-davos-as-
negotiations-resume-in-canada. 
 111. See Statement by the Canadian American Business Council on Canada/US Trade 
and Border Relations, CISION (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive 
/January2017/25/c6195.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2017). 
 112. The second work plan was also referenced in a February 25, 2016 White House 
press release, see Office of the Vice President, Joint Statement: 2016 U.S.-Mexico High-
Level Dialogue, OBAMAWHITEHOUSE.ARCHIVES.GOV (Feb. 25, 2016), https://obamawhiteho 
use.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/joint-statement-2016-us-mexico-high-level-
economic-dialogue. 
 113. See High Level Economic Dialogue: Fact Sheet, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
https://www.trade.gov/hled/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2017). 
 114. See Tal Kopan, Here’s What Trump’s Budget Proposes to Cut, CNN (Mar. 16, 2017, 1:21 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/16/politics/trump-budget-cuts/ (discussing executive orders 
significantly reducing the budgets of over ten agencies, with the environmental protection 
agency having the steepest cut of 31.4%). 
 115. See Rachel Augustine Potter, Why Trump Can’t Undo the Regulatory State So 
Easily, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-
trump-cant-undo-the-regulatory-state-so-easily/ (stating, “an alternative to repealing 
regulations will be for the administration simply to decline to enforce those rules that are 
already on the books. Feeble enforcement is harder for courts and other actors to counter 
than formal deregulation.”). 
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2. “Formal” Collaboration: Transnational Regulatory Cooperation 
after 2010  
Aside from recent U.S. shifts in trade and regulatory policies, the 
less formal nature of transnational regulatory cooperation continues 
and is becoming more formalized through preferential trade 
agreements, as has been demonstrated in sustainable development 
agenda for EU states as well as in the CETA.116 These create more 
structured means of transnational dialogue with regard to regulatory 
convergence and harmonization.  
Similarly, in this era of plurilateral agreements, the TPP and TTIP 
are models of the ways in which trade agreements can have intense 
regulatory impact not only on the countries involved but also for 
nonparticipating countries. As has been observed above, there are 
differences in the TPP and CETA provisions, especially regarding the 
rigor of sustainable development, environment, and labor provisions. 
But it is also interesting to note that the participants in these 
agreements are different. Though there may be a general assumption 
that the United States is more deferential to private interests and, 
therefore, less willing to invoke stricter environmental standards, the 
TPP contains less stringent provisions regarding sustainable 
development and the environment than the EU draft for the TTIP. This 
is because of the large number of parties coming from the developing 
world, which are reluctant to embrace stricter environmental standards 
for fear that they will impede their economic development.  
a. TPP 
Despite this concern, as compared to earlier U.S. free trade 
agreements with developing countries, the TPP contemplates areas of 
public concern more generously than in the past.117 For example, the 
labor chapter adheres to ILO standards and condemns the use of 
unhealthy working standards.118 It prohibits derogation from these 
obligations, even for the sake of trade and investment.119 Both the 
environmental and labor chapters contain provisions regarding 
corporate social responsibility.120 As compared to CETA, it is notable 
that the TPP contains weaker provisions around sustainable 
development and is ambiguous in incorporating the precautionary 
                                                                                                     
 116. See, e.g., THE GERMAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 94. 
 117. See references cited supra note 2. 
 118. See TPP, supra note 45, arts. 19.2, 19.3, 19.6. 
 119. See id. art. 19.4. 
 120. See id. arts. 19.7 (labor), 20.10 (environment). 
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principle or in clarifying a position on process production methods. 
Furthermore, much like other recent U.S. free trade agreements, 
voluntary mechanisms to enhance environmental performance are 
specifically encouraged.121 Joint cooperation on setting regulatory 
standards will be part of the TPP as well.122 The omission of the 
precautionary principle is not only consistent with the U.S. preference 
for the “substantial equivalence” standard, but also reflects a hesitancy 
on the side of developing countries, including Mexico, to incorporate 
such provisions. One need only look to the reports from the negotiations 
of the Havana Charter to be reminded that developing countries, like 
Mexico, did not want to include specific environmental issues, such as 
the conservation of fisheries as part of the exceptions allowed under 
Article XX of the GATT.123 The fact that the TPP mentions the 
protection of the marine environment from ship pollution is a step 
toward convergence with environmental concerns for the trade 
community, even for the developing countries participating in the 
agreement.124 Interestingly, Article 20.13 of the TPP recognizes the 
parties’ commitment to biodiversity, including the “sustainable use of 
biodiversity.” However, it also reiterates a commitment to “facilitating 
access to genetic resources within their respective national 
jurisdictions.”125 The current TTIP draft, on the other hand, encourages 
mutual recognition of each region’s regulations, which, in theory, would 
allow the U.S. and the EU to maintain their respective regulatory 
preferences, even in the area of food safety. 
The weak jurisprudence by the WTO on the precautionary 
principle126 also reflects this tension between the developing and 
                                                                                                     
 121. See id. art. 20.11. 
 122. See id. art. 20.12(2) (“Taking account of their national priorities and circumstances, 
and available resources, the Parties shall cooperate to address matters of joint or common 
interest among the participating Parties related to the implementation of this Chapter, 
when there is mutual benefit from that cooperation.”). 
 123. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Reports of Committees and 
Principal Sub-Committees, U.N. Doc. ICITO I/8, at 84–85, ¶¶ 18, 21 (Sept. 1948) 
[hereinafter Havana Reports]. 
 124. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.6 (Protection of the Marine Environment from Ship 
Pollution). The CETA has broader provisions on the protection of marine life and fisheries. 
See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement arts. 7.3, 7.4, 24.11, Oct. 30, 2016, 
[hereinafter CETA], http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en 
/pdf. 
 125. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.13(4). This provision also recognizes the importance 
of respecting the practices of indigenous communities. See id. art. 20.13(3). 
 126. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 83 (stating that the WTO cannot rule on the 
EU’s use of the precautionary principle because it is not a recognized rule of international 
customary law). 
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developed world when it comes to the environment and international 
trade relationship: Stricter environmental standards, especially 
regarding the ways in which goods are produced, translate into more 
expensive levels of production and more obstacles for economic 
development. This old tug of war, first reflected in US-Tuna I between 
the United States and Mexico, continues into today’s discussions around 
an Agreement on Environmental Goods and Services and development. 
It is not so surprising that a trade agreement between Canada and the 
European Union would have more rigorous provisions in this regard 
than the TPP.  
b. CETA and TTIP 
The Canadian-European Union Trade Agreement’s (CETA) chapter 
on the environment does not contain a precautionary principle per se,127 
but it does recognize that the “lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”128 It also has a separate chapter on trade 
and sustainable development, as well as separate chapters on trade and 
labor and trade and environment.129 In recognizing the relevance of the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and other 
relevant agreements, CETA’s Chapter on Sustainable Development 
states “that economic development, social development and 
environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing 
components of sustainable development” and that trade should promote 
sustainable development.130 One of the challenges for sustainable 
development is finding international consensus on defining it.131 The 
CETA attempts to do so, at least in the context of trade, when it states 
that part of the parties’ understanding about what constitutes the 
                                                                                                     
 127. See generally CETA, supra note 124, art. 24.8(2) (“The Parties acknowledge that 
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. chs. 23–24. Prior drafts of CETA contained a precautionary principle as well 
as sub-chapters on trade and labor and trade and environment, as part of the larger 
chapter on trade and sustainable development. The EU has given up on the precautionary 
principle, despite it being part of the EU policy, in other free trade agreements, such as 
with South Korea, Peru, and Colombia. 
 130. See id. ch. 22. 
 131. The Brundtland Report defines sustainability as “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.” Secretary General, Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, annex, at 41 (Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter Brundtland 
Report]. 
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objective of sustainable development, is that it is “for the welfare of 
present and future generations.”132 It also states: “The Parties 
acknowledge that where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, the lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”133 Furthermore, the chapters on environment and on labor 
recognize the parties’ right to regulate the environment and to strive to 
improve environmental regulation,134 and that they shall not derogate 
from environmental protection for the sake of encouraging trade and 
investment.135  
The Sustainable Development chapter also recognizes the value for 
international coordination and “the integration at the international 
level of economic, social and environmental development and protection 
initiatives, actions and measure.”136 The parties also assert that “trade 
should promote sustainable development,”137 which is a leap for 
international trade agreements when it comes to the intersection of the 
two camps. 
The means for achieving this are varied, but the use of voluntary 
mechanisms for regulation are encouraged in CETA.138 The TBT chapter 
in the CETA incorporates parts of the WTO TBT Agreement (as the SPS 
chapter also incorporates parts of the WTO SPS Agreement) and forms 
a committee for enhanced coordination among regulatory bodies 
between the EU and Canada with respect to TBT measures, which can 
impact environmental regulation especially if labeling mechanisms are 
used as tools for such voluntary regulation.139  
A Committee on Sustainable Development is formed under Chapter 
22:4, consisting of representatives of the parties responsible for matters 
                                                                                                     
 132. See CETA, supra note 124, art. 22.1. It further states: “[Recalling] the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, the Agenda 21 on Environment 
and Development of 1992, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development of 
2002 and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development of 
2002, the Ministerial Declaration of the United Nations Economic and Social Council on 
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 133. See id. art. 24.8(2). 
 134. See id. chs. 23–24 (discussing trade and labor and trade and environment in the 
context of CETA). 
 135. See id. chs. 8 (9), 24 (5). 
 136. Id. art. 22.3(1). 
 137. Id. art. 22.3(2). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. arts. 6.3 (release of goods), 6.4 (customs valuation), 6.6 (fees and charges), 
6.8 (automation). 
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under the environment and labor chapters. Interestingly, this 
committee will oversee the implementation of those chapters, “including 
cooperative activities,” and “address in an integrated manner any 
matter of common interest to the Parties in relation to the interface 
between economic development, social development and environmental 
protection.”140 The Environment chapter establishes a Panel of Experts 
that can be convened when disagreement cannot be resolved through 
consultations.141 CETA also emphasizes that trade should not 
undermine the environment, but rather promote it through the 
recognition, for example, of environmental goods and services.142 It has 
special provisions concerning climate change and renewable energy and 
the need for domestic strategies to promote the mitigation of climate 
change.143 Furthermore, it recognizes “promotion of life-cycle 
management of goods, including carbon accounting and end-of-life 
management, extended producer-responsibility, recycling and reduction 
of waste, and other best practice.”144 This is the first time a trade 
agreement is this explicit regarding these issues as being part of the 
international trade legal framework. 
Though the negotiation of the TTIP has been put on hold 
indefinitely, the textual proposal of the “Horizontal Chapter” provides 
some information for the role of the Regulatory Cooperation Body.145 
Furthermore, a look at the CETA chapter on regulatory cooperation, 
which also recognizes the right of nations to regulate, gives insight into 
the European Union and Canadian positions on such type of cooperation 
for future EU trade agreements and, in the case of Canada, for the 
NAFTA renegotiations.146 Considering the public concern around such 
trade agreements’ lower regulatory standards, it is also helpful to 
consider such a regulatory cooperation board in the context of other 
chapters on sustainable development, the environment, and even the 
TBT and SPS chapters. These latter chapters also create coordinating 
bodies around technical regulations, phytosanitary measures, and 
environmental regulations. By establishing a Sustainable Development 
                                                                                                     
 140. Id. art. 22.4(1). 
 141. See id. art. 24.15. 
 142. See id. art. 24.9. 
 143. See id. art. 24.12(d)–(f). 
 144. Id. art. 24.12(h). 
 145. See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, E.U.-U.S., art. 5, made 
public May 4, 2015, [hereinafter TTIP] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march 
/tradoc_154377.pdf. 
 146. See CETA, supra note 124, at ch. 21. Canada is more likely to ask for right to 
regulate provisions in the revised NAFTA as well as more concessions regarding climate 
change mitigation efforts, since it remains a member of the Paris Climate Agreement, and 
on hydropower trade with the Unites States. 
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Committee that oversees the environment and labor chapters, the 
CETA explicitly links the sustainable development chapter to the 
environment and labor one and requires that the relevant committees 
work with one another, creating a transnational “shared regulatory 
space.” Chapter Twenty-Five creates a less formal cooperative platform 
to encourage bilateral dialogue dealing exclusively with fisheries, 
forestries, raw materials, and biotechnology. It will consist of co-chairs 
who will report to the CETA joint committee established under Chapter 
Twenty-Six.147 The CETA joint committee consists of representatives 
from Canada and the European Union, and the chairs shall be the 
Minister of International Trade of Canada and a Member of the 
European Commission responsible for trade. There is no explicit 
provision linking the CETA Joint Committee in Chapter Twenty-Six of 
ETA to the other regulatory committees; however, the scope section of 
this chapter authorizes the CETA Joint Committee to delegate issues to 
more specialized committees created in the other chapters (i.e., 
Sustainable Development) and communicate with all interested parties, 
“including private sector and civil society organizations.”148 CETA also 
establishes a number of specialized agencies, including a regulatory 
cooperation forum, which addresses matters of regulatory 
cooperation.149 Decisions of the CETA Joint Committee shall be binding 
on the parties.150 
The Regulatory Cooperation Board in the negotiated TPP does not 
make this textual and substantive leap. It does create a Board that will 
be influential in coordinating regulatory measures across sectors and 
member countries, but remains elusive as to its relative authority to 
deal with specific regulatory measures regarding phytosanitary 
measures and food products, for example. Furthermore, the TPP does 
not have a separate chapter on sustainable development and is not as 
explicit as to what it means by this term, as is found in the CETA. The 
                                                                                                     
 147. The Regulatory Cooperation Board is no longer used as in earlier versions. Instead, 
a CETA joint committee is established; however, regulatory cooperation is discussed in 
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regulations. See CETA, supra note 124, art. 26.1. 
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does not do this. Rather, it recognizes the commitments of the Parties to the SPS 
Agreement, and specifically incorporates certain sections of the TBT Agreement into the 
TPP. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 124, arts. 5.15.14; TPP, supra note 45, arts. 7.2, 7.4 
(SPS), 8.4 (TBT). 
 149. See CETA, supra note 124, art. 26.2(1)(h). 
 150. See id. art. 26.3. 
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CETA’s chapter on environment recognizes commitments under several 
multilateral environmental agreements.151  
Whereas the TPP is consistent with NAFTA and subsequent U.S. 
free trade agreements regarding the TBT and SPS chapters, though the 
TPP arguably goes a little further in some aspects like clarifying the 
role of science and risk, the CETA goes farther in dealing with issues 
not addressed explicitly in prior trade agreements. If in fact TTIP 
negotiations were to recommence, it is unclear whether it will contain 
the more rigorous provisions on these issues concerning sustainable 
development and the environment of CETA or whether it will have 
weaker provisions as are found in the TPP. Given that the European 
Union has concluded the CETA and is in the process of concluding other 
preferential trade agreements that contain similar provisions,152 it is 
likely that sustainable development, regulatory coordination, and the 
right to regulate provisions will become the “new norm” and leave the 
U.S. position on these issues behind. The question will remain as to the 
balance of trade liberalization and environmental issues—whether the 
future of economic relations will continue to contain the same discourse, 
with the scales tipping toward free trade, or whether regulatory 
coordination, as we see in the CETA, will lead to more allowances by the 
trade community for enhanced regulation, whether public or private, 
even if this implicates restraints on trade. Though this paper does not 
focus on the ways that these trends in trade impact the role of executive 
authority in Europe, the transnational nature of regulatory cooperation 
in trade clearly does play an important role in expanding the authority 
of the European Commission on its Member States.153 
3. Closer Look at Regulatory Cooperation for Environmental 
Regulation and Sustainable Development 
Though regulatory cooperation and sustainable development 
provisions in the TPP did not go as far as in the CETA or TTIP, the TPP 
demonstrated an important step by the U.S. government to broaden the 
scope of trade in this context. In the Environment chapter of the TPP, 
Article 20.11 recognized that voluntary mechanisms, and the “voluntary 
                                                                                                     
 151. See id. art. 24.4. 
 152. For a list of current negotiations on EU trade agreements, including modifications 
to its agreements with Mexico and MERCOSUR and new agreements with Japan, China, 
and other countries in Asia, see Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, EUR. 
COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (last 
updated Nov. 2017). 
 153. See, e.g., Elliot Posner, Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium, 63 INT”L ORG. 665 (2009).  
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sharing of information and expertise, and public-private partnerships, 
can contribute to the achievement and maintenance of high levels of 
environmental protection and complement domestic regulatory 
measures.”154 It encouraged the TPP member states (the Parties) to use 
voluntary standards for the protection of natural resources and 
environment in the territory. This trend is consistent with its other 
recent U.S. free trade agreements, such as U.S.-Peru and U.S.-
Columbia, which also contain provisions encouraging the use of free-
market principles for environmental regulation.155 Chapter Twenty of 
the TPP went even further. It also asked that authorities, the private 
sector, civil society, and other stakeholders already involved in the 
development of such standards continue.156 It encouraged parties to 
ensure that such standards were developed truthfully, taking into 
account scientific and technical expertise; were based on international 
standards; allowed for competition and innovation; and did not 
discriminate on the basis of origin.157 Furthermore, cooperation among 
stakeholders was required and a Committee on the Environment was 
created to ensure such cooperation.158 This was a separate committee 
from the Regulatory Coherence Committee set up in Chapter Twenty-
Five of the TPP.159  
The CETA chapter on sustainable development also promotes the 
use of voluntary schemes for production, such as in areas like eco-
labeling and fair practices. However, it asks the parties to consider 
sustainability “in private and public consumption decisions.”160 This 
CETA chapter also goes one step further. It encourages parties, in 
addressing sustainable development issues, to conduct assessments, 
domestically but also jointly, around the “potential economic, social and 
environmental impacts of possible actions, taking account of the views 
of stakeholders.”161  
There were reports of the TTIP claiming that the TTIP would 
contain a chapter on sustainable development, as well as on energy and 
raw materials.162 The TPP contained provisions on sustainable 
                                                                                                     
 154. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.11(1). 
 155. See, e.g., United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 90; 
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 90. 
 156. See TPP, supra note 45, arts. 20.1.23. 
 157. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.11(2)–(3). 
 158. See id. art. 20.12. 
 159. See id. art. 25.6. 
 160. CETA, supra note 124, art. 22.3(2)(c). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Note the 2015 Guardian report with leaked text that said that environment took on 
a lesser role. The old version was scrapped and a November 6th report after the Miami 
meeting stated that more vigorous provisions would be in the draft. See Arthur Neslen, 
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development in the general commitments and objectives sections of the 
Environment chapter, as well as provisions on natural resources and 
carbon emissions. However, the EU draft seemed to define sustainable 
development more broadly than the TPP, including not only 
environmental concerns but also those of labor and climate change. It 
focused on the right of governments to continue to regulate in areas of 
environmental protection and labor, with adherence to international 
agreements like the ILO in the case of labor. It is unclear whether there 
would be mention of voluntary mechanisms for regulation, but it is clear 
that the European Union is concerned about the ability of Member 
states to continue to regulate.163  
As EU trade negotiations evolve and the rise in voluntary forms of 
regulation on them continues, albeit to different degrees on either side 
of the Atlantic, different understandings of what constitutes regulation, 
the right to regulate, and risk assessment emerge. This divergence is at 
the core of the regulatory differences between the United States and the 
European Union. For purposes of trade and the WTO, it is state action 
that must be disciplined in order to avoid protectionism that can impede 
free trade. The WTO’s scope is not to oversee private action of corporate 
actors, but rather to discipline government behavior. 
IV.  CHALLENGES AHEAD 
A. The U.S./EU Regulatory Divide and Its Impact on the Developing 
World 
Where government oversight is involved, especially if mandatory, 
there is an increased likelihood of such measures being construed as 
trade barriers for the WTO dispute settlement body. The EC-Biotech 
case, involving EU regulations on imports of “biotech products,” which 
also contained intricate administrative procedures for approval of such 
products before entering the European Union as well as labeling 
requirements as part of their marketing,164 raised this issue of 
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 163. See Andrew Walker, TTIP: Why the EU-US Trade Deal Matters, BBC NEWS (May 
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Directive 90/200/EEC); Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1 (EC) (repealing 
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mandatory government oversight. In 2009, the United States began 
consultations regarding EU restrictions on the import of poultry treated 
with any substance other than water without EU approval.165 These 
regulations also included measures for marketing the poultry, requiring 
that the poultry indicate that it has not undergone any other chemical 
treatment. Because of the inherent differences in the ways the United 
States and the European Union perceive the role of government in 
overseeing the implementation of labels and their different views of the 
need to protect the consumer from genetically modified organisms or 
other chemical treatments to foods, the United States and European 
Union have achieved little in coming to an agreement on trade of these 
products.166 Furthermore, WTO litigation around these issues has only 
exacerbated the conflict and resulted in the European Union and the 
United States not finding a bilateral solution. In this context, normative 
conflict has not resulted in convergence, at least not in the short-term. 
Rather, the two regions have expanded their differing standards into 
the developing world.167  
Developing countries in trading relationships with either the United 
States or the European Union are compelled to follow one or the other’s 
GMO position or else lose a potential market for their agricultural 
products.168 In this way, the European Union and the United States 
have influenced food standards in other countries, especially developing 
countries. Argentina, for example, is the third largest grower of biotech 
products and user of GMOs in their food products, after Brazil and the 
United States.169 Mexico has restrictions on the use of GMO products, 
but has been slowly loosening these, as a result of (1) cross-pollination 
coming from U.S. agricultural imports containing GMOs;170 and (2) 
                                                                                                     
Council Directive 90/200/EEC); see also Panel Report, European Communities—Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 83. 
 165. See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities— 
Certain Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United 
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recent pressure from its close northern neighbor, due to the U.S.-run 
corn intensive high fructose syrup industry in Mexico.171  
A Mexican case, involving Monsanto and other U.S. food producers, 
reflects this tension over GMOs. In 2013, a federal judge in Mexico City 
decided to temporarily halt new GMO corn permits in an effort to 
protect biodiversity and the variety of native Mexican maize species, 
many of which have been contaminated as a result of the introduction of 
GMO corn from the United States.172 This decision was overturned by 
Mexico’s XII District Court.173 This decision came after two years of 
ninety-three appeals by primarily U.S. biotech companies following the 
2013 ban by the Twelfth Federal District Court for Civil Matters. Most 
African nations, on the other hand, have stricter policies on GMO 
agricultural products due to their dependence on the European Union as 
a primary food supplier.174 No consensus has been achieved as to 
whether the better food standard includes GMOs or not. Clearly for the 
European Union, food safety should exclude GMOs. Yet at the heart of 
the WTO Biotech case was not only the different regulatory values 
regarding food safety and the use of GMOs, but also the distinct 
approaches to risk and risk assessment processes at the domestic or 
regional level between the two continents. The United States adheres to 
a “sufficient scientific evidence” standard, whereas the European Union 
holds fast to the “precautionary principle,” reflecting a strong 
“divergence of preferences” at the regulatory level of both continents, 
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 174. Ademola A. Adenle, Are Transgenic Crops Safe? GM Agriculture in Africa, UNITED 
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which is not easily overcome, even with cooperation.175 On the other 
hand, having such a divergence of preferences allows for 
experimentation in regulation and no one model of handling risk to 
dominate. Though it fosters regulatory fragmentation, making it more 
difficult to achieve harmonization, it arguably allows for regulatory 
structures to emerge locally and is better suited to address local and 
regional problems. 
B. Transnational Executive Authority and the Geopolitical Context of 
Transnational Regulatory Standards 
In either scenario, one thing remains clear: future trade 
negotiations will give more weight to regulatory coherence than ever 
before through the establishment of formal coordinating bodies. This 
emphasis will increase opportunities for the U.S. executive power to 
expand its scope in specific ways concerning social policy making, while 
responding to specific calls to further trade liberalization and free 
market liberalization. This trend will, in turn, impact the ways in which 
the BRIC countries and lesser developed countries will develop their 
own regulatory structures and standards. As Daniel Drezner has so 
eloquently observed, while globalization has weakened the ability of 
states to regulate domestically, the primary actors setting the rules for 
regulatory coherence have been the great powers—namely, the United 
States and the European Union.176 And yet, they have not always 
agreed on the ways in which to regulate. Though global power has been 
recalibrated with the emergence of the BRICs and China more 
specifically as a strong economic force, when it comes to regulatory 
standards, the United States and the European Union continue to lead 
the world when it comes to setting regulatory standards. Therefore, to 
the extent that the TTIP provides an opportunity for the two regions to 
reach consensus of the areas that need regulation for the twenty-first 
century and of the ways of ensuring heightened protection of the items 
concerning natural resources, climate change, and public health, then 
the TTIP, if completed, could have a positive impact globally. The 
direction of global regulatory standards and the tolerance of regulation, 
as set by the TTIP, will depend to a large extent on the stakeholders 
participating in the discourse of those regulatory coordination boards. 
Though non-state actors can certainly influence the outcomes and as 
Drezner states, “jump-start regulatory agendas to advance their 
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 176. Id. at 149–75. 
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issues,”177 the states, especially those with most global influence, are 
still relevant. Therefore, ensuring that regulatory cooperation boards 
have not only the participation of representatives of the product supply 
chain networks and the private sector178 but also that of civil society and 
citizens is important. Interestingly, the CETA encourages the 
participation of civil society in dialoguing with the states on sustainable 
development standards.179 Sustainability impact assessments that 
include qualitative as well as quantitative data, as is encouraged in 
CETA and in the current TTIP draft, will play a larger role as well, 
especially for risk assessment processes.180 Since the TTIP negotiations 
have been put on hold and the United States has withdrawn from the 
TPP, the European model for regulatory cooperation, demonstrated 
through its current trade negotiations with various countries, will likely 
dominate for now. 
Despite Europe’s continued influence, the rise of the Chinese 
economy and its need for natural resources cannot be ignored. China is 
also a key player on the world political scene. Besides the strategic role 
it plays in Asian geopolitics and its status as a nuclear nation, it is a 
member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization, 
the Group of seventy-seven Developing Nations, the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Group, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. It has been a major player in Africa, contributing to the 
development of many infrastructure projects in exchange for access to 
natural resources.181 Similarly, it has an increasing role in Latin 
America. China has observer status in the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and keeps a peacekeeping mission in Haiti. In 2009, China 
Development Bank announced it would lend $10 billion to Petrobras, 
the state-owned Brazilian oil company, in exchange for a guaranteed 
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supply of oil over the next decade.182 In 2005, China’s oil and gas giant 
Sinopec Corp. signed an agreement with Cuba’s state-run Cubapetroleo 
(Cupet) to jointly produce oil on the Caribbean island. China’s state-
owned Minmetals is investing $500 million in a joint venture to produce 
68,000 tonnes a year of ferro-nickel in eastern Cuba.183 
Similarly, many of the WTO cases today concern more regular areas 
of natural resource extraction and domestic clean energy strategies like 
FIT schemes and biofuel policies.184 As trade expands so does economic 
growth, which in turn, leads to increased energy demand. For many 
countries, developed and developing, natural resource extraction has 
been at the center of economic growth policies. Shale gas production in 
the United States is projected to account for two-thirds of U.S. natural 
gas production by 2040.185 The United States and Canada are the 
world’s top producers of shale gas production, having accounted for 39 
percent of U.S. natural gas production in 2012 and 15 percent of 
Canada’s according to a 2013 report from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.186 However, there is little federal regulation in the 
United States of shale gas, so this is one area where federal agency 
power, at least for the initial exploratory and extractive components of 
shale gas production, is perhaps less relevant.187 Most of the current 
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regulation is at the state level, and it is being done piece-meal and 
issue-based, with much heterogeneity among the states.188 For example, 
in the last five years, U.S. states have taken differing approaches to 
developing disclosure requirements regarding the chemicals being used 
for hydraulic fracturing, which requires a large amount of fresh 
water.189 Some states, like New York, have taken a precautionary 
approach, placing a temporary moratorium on the hydraulic fracturing 
until further environmental impact assessments are done and state 
disclosure requirements are completed.190 Some states, like Colorado, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania regulate with relative stringency in specific 
aspects of fracturing, and others like Virginia and California, with 
minimal stringency.191  
Europe, on the other hand, has mostly taken a precautionary 
approach when it comes to hydraulic fracturing. It has been up to each 
Member State to decide its position on the issue. For the most part, 
most EU countries have placed moratoria on hydraulic fracturing until 
more studies and environmental impact assessments are done.192 In 
2011, a report commissioned by the European Parliament noted the 
various health and environmental risks associated with hydraulic 
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fracturing.193 France, Germany, and Bulgaria have all taken firm 
stances against hydraulic fracturing and EU researchers and leaders 
have chosen to halt projects until further data becomes available 
regarding environmental and water contamination.194 Many European 
countries have gone so far as enacting bans and moratoriums on 
fracking.195 In January of 2012, Bulgaria indicated that it is preparing 
for a “full ban on shale gas drilling due to environmental concerns that 
hydraulic fracturing may contaminate water.”196 Within the European 
Union, stringent regulations are imposed on private entities in order to 
eliminate harmful effects on the environment. Another difference 
between the U.S. and EU approaches to hydraulic fracturing is in the 
character of property rights attributed to natural resources. Private 
property rights in the majority of European countries only extend to the 
surface.197 Below the surface the soil and minerals are publicly 
owned.198 In contrast, in the United States, soil and minerals below the 
surface are private property allowing for the private sale of minerals for 
extraction. Individual property owners may sell the rights, making a 
profit from royalty rights, to energy companies to extract underground 
minerals on their property. In this way, individuals are incentivized to 
enter into private contracts with these companies in ways that are not 
present in Europe.  
So far, the United States leads the world in this industry, but there 
are a substantial number of shale reserves all over the world, especially 
in Latin America. Recently, Columbia approved hydraulic fracturing in 
specific areas of the northern part of the country, as did Argentina.199 
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Mexico too is working on legislation to open up its energy industry, 
traditionally constitutionally protected, to private investment. It 
already has in place legislation for shale gas production in the Gulf of 
Mexico.200 As this industry expands and grows, so will the 
environmental impact.201 The ways in which the United States 
regulates (or not) this industry will have effects on the manner in which 
other regulatory bodies decide to regulate the industry. Despite the 
United States retreating from the global stage in other areas, it remains 
an important energy market player.202 It continues to increase its export 
market of liquefied gas to Japan.203 However, forty percent of the global 
liquefied gas trade goes through the South China Sea.204 Yet, much like 
in the GMO context, the United States and the European Union have 
very different approaches to how to manage the risk associated with 
energy development, which can further divide the developing world as, 
it too, cultivates its natural resources as part of their development 
strategies. Including regulatory cooperation regarding energy 
production and energy trade in trade agreements is yet another way in 
which the executive branch can influence the harmonization of 
regulations in this context. 
Energy production has also been closely tied to the political rhetoric 
around job creation in a time when the global economy is undergoing 
challenges it has not seen since the Great Depression in 1929. Clean 
energy strategies are framed as achieving two primarily goals: (1) to 
provide much needed alternative energy sources as production increases 
and the developing world develops at faster rates than in the past, and 
(2) to mitigate climate change consequences by shifting the emphasis 
toward “clean” strategies of production and supply. This emphasis on 
energy and natural resource extraction as part of economic development 
is front and center for international trade and investment today, and it 
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reshapes the relationship between the developing and developed world. 
Provisions concerning clean energy are found in the TPP, drafts of the 
TTIP, and in the CETA, but they are not the primary focus of these 
agreements. And yet, natural resource extraction and renewable energy 
strategies are very much at the forefront of domestic policies for 
economic development and job creation. 
For developing countries like Latin America, natural resource 
extraction is a janus-faced phenomenon, in that it is connected to 
economic development but also resurrects a colonial past in which 
industrialized countries used their natural resources for their own 
economic development.205 For this reason, many Latin American 
countries, for example, maintain that natural resources are 
constitutionally protected and have legal doctrines like the Calvo 
Doctrine.206 In negotiating new trade agreements, it is important to 
reframe the trade and environment relationship in a manner that better 
incorporates this new landscape of economic development through 
natural resource extraction as well as climate change concerns. It will 
create new implications for the relationships between the developed and 
developing world as it relates to free trade and the environment, 
accounting for the current geopolitical climate, which includes the 
relevance of the BRICs in this respect. But it will also impact 
transnational regulatory processes, especially as environmental 
regulation increasingly moves toward market-driven mechanisms of 
governance. Transnational regulatory cooperation is important in the 
management of natural resources and climate change strategies as well 
as in the development of greener forms of energy. However, the 
oversight and management of these areas will remain intensely 
domestic and under the purview of agencies. A multi-dimensional 
framework for the trade and sustainable development relationship that 
incorporates this complexity is necessary. 
 
CONCLUSION: TRADE AND REGULATORY CONVERGENCE: IS THE FOX IN THE 
HENHOUSE? 
While formalizing transnational regulatory coherence in trade 
agreements provides opportunities to streamline regulations, coordinate 
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licensing standards, and reach shared goals that benefit both business 
and the public sector, it also raises concerns regarding the stakeholders 
at play and whether the public interest is best served. It arguably 
allows for more public participation by various stakeholders, public and 
private, in the negotiation of these trade agreements, but it also has the 
potential of diminishing the role of public comment on new regulations 
and runs the risk that some regulations that benefit trade may be at 
cross purposes with the public interest, unless the agreement 
specifically allows some rebalancing in cases of environmental goods, for 
example, and climate change mitigation (as in CETA). From a 
governance perspective, though, regulatory cooperation bodies and 
specialized committees within these trade agreements can be an 
important step toward global governance, with the “transfer[ring] [of] 
authority from the national to the supranational.”207 This will require 
increased technical expertise and allow for more efficient regulatory 
decision-making, and potentially more inter-agency coordination at the 
domestic level that takes into account the need to reduce the potential 
for trade protectionism. 
However, without some recognition that regulation essentially 
protects the public good and therefore directly implicates the citizen, 
these treaties with formalized regulatory cooperation bodies and 
specialized committees also provide a means to circumvent the 
democratic process.208 Furthermore, as knowledge and political decision-
making become more technocratic domestically and opportunities for 
more transnational decision-making are in place, the executive 
authority who is responsible for negotiating these agreements also 
becomes embedded in a regulatory bargaining process, shifting the 
traditional role of the executive branch in the trade agreement process. 
In addition, with U.S. fast-track authority, legislative involvement is 
arguably reduced, contributing to an increased democratic deficit and 
essentially leaving it up to regulators, interest groups, and other 
stakeholders most interested in the regulatory outcomes as having the 
greatest influence on the final trade agreement. Despite these 
challenges, though, regulatory coordination is more likely to occur 
regionally than globally because of the difficulty of reaching political 
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consensus on a global scale. Negotiating preferential trade agreements 
that increase the role of transnational regulatory boards allows for 
important dialogues to take place, and for trade interests and regulatory 
ones to find common ground. At the same time, it allows executive 
authority and the concentration of expertise in technocrats to pave the 
direction of the areas that are regulated and the method of regulation. 
Expansion of the transnational executive has important 
implications for domestic regulation, especially in the United States’ 
current climate of feeble regulatory enforcement. If instead of the TPP, 
the United States decides to enter into bilateral trade agreements, 
especially with Asian countries, regulatory coherence and reduction will 
likely continue to be front and center of those negotiations. Using 
international trade agreements to formalize regulatory standards, or 
lessen the use of these standards, requires full participation of all 
interests for these standards to be effective in protecting the public 
interest. Participation should include representatives from civil society 
and developing countries, where natural resources are robust. The 
formalizing of regulatory standards in these ways, especially if the U.S. 
and the EU lead the charge, will have external impacts on how 
regulatory standards develop in other countries as well. A transfer of 
regulatory authority to the executive branch, especially coupled with 
executive power to negotiate trade agreements, not only increases the 
role of the specialized expertise, but it also can potentially create 
perverse effects on democracy itself.  
